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REPUTA TION FOR EMU
An Economic Defence of the 
Maastricht Criteria*
Bernhard Winkler
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico (Firenze) 
E-mail: winkler@datacomm.iue.it
"L'Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas" 
J a c q u es  R u e ff  1950
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a two-period model of a monetary policy game with 
incomplete information in order to analyze reputational incentives in the 
run-up to European Monetary Union. The Maastricht criteria are 
characterized as a simple threshold contract that selects countries for 
EMU membership contingent on their inflation performance. It is 
suggested that the Maastricht criteria have an important role to play in 
two ways. They may confer commitment to policy prior to EMU and 
they may induce preference revelation of policymakers.
1 would like to thank Michael Artis and Spyros Vassilakis for helpful discussion and the 






















































































































































































Policy: The Passage to EMU
EMU, Economic and Monetary Union as the centrepiece of the Maastricht 
Treaty, is arguably Europe's most ambitious project since the Treaty of Rome. It 
is also the most contentious and it may yet turn out to be the "bird that does not 
fly". Whether and when EMU will get off the ground is in the final analysis 
chiefly a question of political will. However, it also depends on whether the 
Maastricht process succeeds sufficiently in providing incentives and in aligning 
and coordinating interests that differ across countries. This paper examines how 
countries' behaviour in the transition to EMU is affected by the convergence 
criteria adopted at Maastricht. We also suggest a novel interpretation of the 
criteria themselves which highlights their role as an information revelation 
mechanism. The model presented, in particular, can be seen to capture a 
distinctive "German view" on EMU which has not yet found resonance in the 
wider academic debate on the subject.
In order to explain the Maastricht criteria we depart from most of the existing 
literature in five ways. First, our work links the long-run performance of EMU to 
counries' behaviour in the transition period, rather than looking at both issues 
separately. This requires a multi-period analysis where the Maastricht criteria 
provide the intertemporal link between policy performance before and after EMU 
has been established. Second, we place conflicts of interest between participating 
countries at the centre of analysis, rather than adopting a single country or pan- 
European perspective. This means we must draw on game theoretic analysis. 
Third, we dispute the claim that the Maastricht entry conditions "have little to do 
with economics" (De Grauwe 1994) but primarily to do with preserving 
Germany's hegemonic position in European monetary policy. Therefore we take 
the Maastricht treaty seriously as a contractual device that affects economic 
outcomes. Fourth, we take issue with the "naive credibility" literature which 
prescribes central bank independence or exchange rate commitments as the cure- 
all. Instead, we suggest that a credible, low inflation EMU must be supported by a 
sound institutional set-up and must be rooted in public preferences and still must 
earn a lot of its reputation the hard way. This motivates our use of the Barro- 
Gordon (1983a) model to capture time inconsistency problems both before and 
within EMU. Fifth, the Maastricht treaty represents a regime shift which is likely 
to compound strategic uncertainty; hence the presence of incomplete information, 
which we require for a meaningful model of reputation.
The policy relevance of our work is immediate. After the virtual collapse of the 



























































































strategy based on the gradual hardening of the exchange rate constraint is 
obsolete. Thus the convergence criteria remain as the only institutional device 
with potential commitment properties that is left. From the start they have also 
been heavily criticized as the main (and harmful) obstacle to EMU. The debate 
surrounding the sense and the interpretation of the criteria will intensify further in 
the run-up to the 1997 and (or) 1999 deadlines for EMU. After the Schauble- 
Lamers proposal of a hard core Europe, launched in September of 1994, the 
related controversy about multi-speed approaches to EMU has come out into the 
open. This makes it all the more important to understand why the criteria were put 
into place and how their presence affects countries' behaviour as well as market 
expectations. The recurrent speculative onslaughts on the weaker European 
currencies and bond markets are a case in point.
The Maastricht Criteria - A Tale of Chicken
The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that stage three of EMU comes into effect in 
1997 if a majority of EU member states satisfies the convergence criteria listed 
below in the 12 month period preceeding initiation of EMU. Otherwise monetary 
union would start automatically in 1999 with whichever countries by then satisfy 
the criteria. The decision as to which countries can be judged to fulfil the criteria 
is taken by majority vote.
THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA :
1. CPI inflation not exceed the inflation rates of the three best performers by 
more than 1.5%
2. Long term interest rates no more than 2% above those o f the three best 
price performers
3. Exchange rates stable within their normal bands, no devaluation on own 
initiative for two years
4. Budget deficit no larger than 3% o f GDP
5. Public debt no larger than 60% o f GDP
Both the fiscal criteria have qualifiers attached which may allow for a liberal 
interpretation. The exchange rate criterion is now widely regarded as being 
applicable to the new wider bands of the ERM, which allow 15% deviations on 




























































































The criteria have been attacked by economists as being arbitrary and misguided 
(especially the fiscal conditions1) as well as being superfluous or worse self- 
defeating (primarily the nominal criteria2). Without reviewing the arguments 
advanced in detail the view taken in this paper is that much of the criticism is 
misplaced, because it ignores the most important functions of the criteria.
In general, if the criteria are to make sense they must provide a linkage between 
behaviour in stage two, prior to EMU, and stage three performance once EMU 
has been achieved. A first place to look for a rationale of the Maastricht condition 
would be the theory o f optimum currency areas (OCA). However, it is quite 
obvious that the criteria have very little to do with the factors identified by OCA 
theory3. There is nothing about wage and price flexibility, factor mobility, fiscal 
co-insurance, trade openness, product diversification and the like. While concerns 
about real economic convergence may well be valid in their own right it is not the 
kind of convergence that Maastricht is all about. A second place to look is the 
more recently fashionable credibility literature4. This at least points in the right 
direction, credibility is indeed the crucial concern in the Maastricht game and the 
one that is reflected in the (predominantly nominal) convergence criteria. 
However, as for example emphasized by De Grauwe (1994), here we run into a 
straightforward paradox. For future reference we shall christen it the "credibility 
paradox". If the main benefit of EMU comes from increased credibility with 
respect to what could be achieved by national policymakers, then making entry to 
EMU conditional on curing the very ills that only the regime shift to EMU itself 
can mend is self-defeating. However, this reasoning disregards the possibility that 
the criteria themselves carry credibility and confer commitment. Then the paradox 
ceases to be one once two naive underlying assumptions are removed. The first is 
that somehow EMU miraculously solves all credibility problems, the second is 
that there are no conflicts of interests across countries. Relaxing the first 
acknowledges that central bank independence is no panacea, that credibility does 
not come entirely for free but must be earned. This paper starts from the premise
1 Buiter (1992) calls them a "triumph of dogma over economic reasoning"; see also Buiter, 
Corsetti and Roubini (1992). To Barrel!, Sefton and in't Veld (1993) it is "not clear why such 
definite criteria have been set". Corsetti and Roubini (1992) point out that more flexible rules 
together with credible sanctions would be preferable. Alesina and Perotti (1994) highlight the 
political economy of the deficit bias which the criteria can be seen to address. Aizenman (1994) 
offers tentative support for limits on public debt to discipline fiscal policy in currency unions.
2 See De Grauwe (1992) for an early discussion.
3 See Eichengreen (1993), Tavlas (1993) and Bofinger (1994) for recent overviews.
4 See Persson (1988) and Blackburn and Christensen (1989) for easy introductions. The reader 
must wait until section 3 for precise definitions of credibility and reputation. For now let both 




























































































that making the European Central Bank independent is only a partial solution. 
Relaxing the second recognizes that there is a clear conflict of interest between 
those countries that (may) hope to gain credibility and those countries that fear 
that they may lose credibility from EMU5.
Relaxing the naive commitment and the naive harmony assumptions 
successively the "credibility paradox" turns into a chicken-and-egg problem and 
into a game o f chicken respectively. The first means that convergence is needed to 
establish EMU's reputation but at the same time EMU's reputation is needed to 
induce convergence. The second means, each of the two parties wants the other to 
commit first, i.e. thè low-credibility countries wants the promise and the benefit of 
EMU-commitment to facilitate convergence, the high credibility countries want 
prior evidence of convergence to insure sufficient EMU reputation. The 
presumption of this paper is that the Maastricht criteria must be seen against the 
horizon of this two way chicken problem. The criteria are a compromise resulting 
from conflict over who should pay for EMU's reputation6. Despite this conflict, 
the game is not zero-sum, however, and there are benefits from not chickening out 
of the Maastricht equilibrium. This paper argues that the criteria can provide a 
bridge over which reputation can travel across time and across countries and it 
interprets them as a mechanism to build reputation for EMU.
The two chicken tales of EMU sketched above give the background to the 
present paper but our main emphasis is on one aspect that is novel to the 
academic debate over EMU. This paper argues that the Maastricht criteria may 
serve a supremely important role even if they have nothing at all to do with 
convergence of economic variables, be they real or nominal. The behaviour that 
the Maastricht criteria seem designed to induce then may well be intrinsically 
worthless, even positively harmful, inflicting pain and damage that appears 
unnecessary, illogical and irrational. Can this "masochism paradox" be resolved 
just like the "credibility paradox"? Yes, if we introduce a third interpretation of 
the Maastricht criteria on top of the two already discussed, namely the reputation 
value (for convergence) and the convergence incentive (for reputation). This third
5 Thus our work is close in spirit to Alesina and Grilli (1993), where performance of EMU 
depends on membership. They have no role for the Maastricht criteria, however. The role of 
conflict has been stressed by De Grauwe (1993), but only as a political problem, and not spelt 
out formally.
6 The clearest manifestation of both the conflict and the compromise found is the ingenious 
Maastricht paradox of making transition to EMU both time- and state-contingent 
simultaneously. On the one hand, there is a deadline (1999) for automatic EMU. This increases 
adjustment pressure on low credibility candidates. On the other hand, the conditionality of the 




























































































aspect of the criteria concerns the informational value of the behaviour they 
induce. The sole linkage we require for this informational story to run is some 
continuity of policymaker preferences over time. If preferences determine EMU 
performance then behaviour in the run-up to EMU becomes important for the 
information it reveals on country preferences if not for anything else. In this 
indirect but important way the Maastricht criteria can help to build reputation for 
EMU not by testing for economic convergence but for convergence of 
preferences7.
It is the view taken in this paper that convergence of policy preferences is of 
the single most importance for the future stability of EMU, the probability that 
EMU happens at all and the composition of its membership. It is also the view 
very deeply engrained in the German thinking on EMU in which a sufficiently 
diffused and sufficiently deeply rooted "stability culture" across Europe, 
consensus on economic policy and a strong political union are taken as 
preconditions for the pooling of monetary sovereignty8. In a narrow interpretation 
"stability culture" just means the degree of inflation aversion and the fiercely 
contested fiscal criteria do not appear immediately relevant. However, once we 
dispense with the "monetarist fallacy" that inflation is a function of central bank 
policy only, the stability orientation of all economic policy actors9 10(particularly 
fiscal authorities and wage setters) including the wider public become important. 
In such a world all the criteria'0 can be seen to test for stability culture across 
economic actors. Thus, even without any of the criteria being directly relevant for
7 This is a different idea from Artis' (1994) defence of the hard-EMS as a "proving ground" 
quasi EMU. Instead it captures the notion expressed by Bundesbank president Tietmeyer 
(1994) that in the convergence stage countries "must demonstrate how serious they are in their 
efforts to lay sound foundations for further monetary integration". For Bundesbank board 
member Prof. Issing (1994) "even a discussion of a relaxation of the convergence criteria must 
give rise to suspicion among those who have distrusted anti-inflationary manifestations in 
respect of EMU from the very outset". Collins and Giavazzi (1992) present evidence that 
attitudes towards inflation had converged in the EMS.
8 Hence the Bundesbank's characterization of EMU as an "irrevocable solidarity union" 
(Tietmeyer 1995).
9 If these other players act strategically we get more games of chicken. Sargent-Wallace (1981) 
drawing on the intertemporal budget constraint linking monetary and fiscal policy is an implicit 
example, but they assume that fiscal authorities can precommit rather than making the chicken 
problem explicit.
10 The arguable exception is the criterion on debt, which as a stock variable reflects not current 
but the history of past credibility. However, the stock of debt affects future credibility via the 




























































































EMU performance they serve a crucial role as auxiliary indicators with regard to 
the central concern of the drafters of the Maastricht criteria over price stability.
In summary, we can interprete the role of the Maastricht criteria in the context 
of the "holy trinity of reputation", i.e. commitment, (convergence) effort and 
preferences. In reality, and arguably even in theory, the three aspects of 
reputation, while distinct, are at the same time inseparably one. To give an 
illustration, the famed reputation of the Bundesbank is a joint product of 
institutional autonomy (commitment/delegation), continuous effort to hold its own 
in the various chicken games11 and finally the deeply rooted inflation aversion of 
the German public, itself a product of the history of two hyperinflations in 
Germany this century. To make the holy trinity whole all three elements are 
indispensable.
O f Theory and Contracts
We have motivated our choice of modelling strategy starting from the practical 
policy debate surrounding the Maastricht criteria which this paper seeks to 
understand. However, the model can be of interest and be justified independently 
of the particular application to EMU that we present. Its potential theoretical 
value derives from the exploration of the interaction of the different elements of 
the holy trinity. The main theoretical innovation is to look at reputation and 
contracts together and not as separate answers to credibility problems.
The credibility literature has identified the problem of time inconsistency of 
optimal plans which is a pervasive feature of policymaking and everyday life 
alike. It basically means that there is an incentive to deviate from an ex-ante 
optimal plan once another player has made a move. In the Barro-Gordon example 
a zero inflation promise is not credible (time-consistent), because, given that the 
public believes the promise, the government has the ex-post incentive to exploit 
the surprise Phillips curve trade-off. As a consequence, a rational public will set 
expectations such that this ex-post incentive vanishes. To overcome problems of 
opportunistic behaviour society has developed a wide array of institutions such as 
constitutions, laws, norms, values, morals (in declining order of formality). 
Economic theory has only considered a subset of these institutions, namely 
contracts and reputational mechanisms in repeated interaction. With contracts the 
problem of credibility is shifted from the optimal policy itself on to the question of 
what makes the contract credible, and some external enforcement mechanism
11 To keep its reputation the Bundesbank repeatedly had to inflict recession on the German 




























































































must then be invoked. Thus commitment remains exogenous. In reputation 
models credibility still remains fundamentally exogenous because it is synonimous 
with the particular game theoretic equilibrium refinement that the modeller 
chooses to adopt. In complete information "reputation" games, e.g. Barro-Gordon 
(1983b) or Canzoneri (1985), multiplicity of equilibria is endemic which renders 
credibility vacuous and arbitrary. We therefore dismiss this branch of the 
literature as providing an inadequate representation of reputation. With 
incomplete information the problem is only ameliorated incompletely, but 
equilibrium refinements at least can here be given some economic interpretation. 
Incomplete information models from the oligopoly literature were first applied to 
monetary policy games by Backus and Driffill (1985) and Vickers (1986); both 
can be seen as special cases of our own model.
Variants of the contract solution to credibility problems have been offered by 
Rogoff (1985), who advocates delegation of policy to conservative central 
bankers, and Lohmann (1992) among others. However, they take a particular 
contract form as given and thus ignore the interesting question of contract choice. 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) have recently recognized that the problem can be 
couched in terms of optimal mechanism design. Yet, moving to a generalized 
optimal contracting environment give us problems at the opposite extreme: lack of 
institutional content and relevance. Moreover, in their discussion the distinctive 
contributions of reputation and contracts in enforcing the optimal policy become 
confused. Therefore our paper proposes what we regard as the only possible way 
out of this dilemma, i.e. to consider simple contracts and institutions that are 
observable in real economic environments. Institutional design is the crucial 
question for EMU both for the transition and for long-run performance. Unlike 
most optimal contracts derived in economics journals, however, observable "real" 
optimal contracts will always be simple, incomplete and often implicit. The 
Maastricht treaty, and the convergence criteria in particular, constitute such a 
contract. Also for this reason many of the economists' criticisms of the criteria are 
misplaced. They have attacked the criteria for being "imperfectly perfect". We 
shall argue that they may be "perfectly imperfect". 2
2. THE MODEL
The model has two parts. First, the contracting stage where the convergence 
criteria are set and second a two period reputation game with the treaty provisions 
taken as given. From backward induction we will discuss the latter stage first. 
Period one of the reputation game corresponds to stage two of the Maastricht 




























































































For each period policymakers' utilities are given by the standard Barro-Gordon 
objective function in equations (1) and (2) below. Utility is decreasing in the 
deviation of inflation from the optimal inflation rate (here set to zero) but 
increasing in surprise inflation. In each period the policymaker who sets the actual 
inflation rate it (taking expectations as given) plays against an atomistic public 
who form inflation expectations ne at the beginning of the period. In the one shot 
game imposing rational expectations (3te = jr) yields an equilibrium inflation rate 
equal to the preference parameter br This gives a utility which is lower than if the 
policymaker could commit ex ante to zero inflation. As we shall see later, in a two 
period game reputational incentives may sustain inflation rates in the first period 
that differ from the one-shot equilibrium. The linearity of the surprise inflation 
term in equation (1) means that the one-shot equilibrium inflation is a dominant 
strategy, independent of expected inflation, and will always obtain in period two 
of the reputation game.
For the purpose of the model we divide Europe into two groups of countries, 
those whose low (here: zero) preference parameters bj are public knowledge and 
those with private information. We call the former group the Principal (P) and the 
latter the Agent (A). The latter can be either high (H) or low (L) inflation 
countries depending on the weight />, in equation (1) and we shall call them weak 
and strong respectively. The prior probabilities over the two types are X for the 
strong (L) type and (1-X) for the weak. The belief X that the policymaker strong is 
our measure of reputation12. Beliefs will be updated in the light of first period 
play.
U[(A)=  -  + bj(n,  -  rtf), i = L,H with bH >hL a 0, t = 1,2 (1)
Ui(P)-  - ’*<2 f = U  ( 2)
We model the convergence criteria as a threshhold contract (here: on inflation) 
which makes entry into EMU conditional on the Agent's period one performance. 
Thus the Maastricht contract / in  equation (3) is a mapping from (the Agent's) first 
period inflation rate into a two-valued set denoting entry (f = 1), if it does not 
exceed the threshhold, and exclusion (f=  0) otherwise.
/ :  * ,=>  {0,1}, / ( * , )
Jo V Jt, > 7C 
[ 1 V it, s  A
(3)
12 Note that "reputation" here is not identical to "credibility". The latter denotes the probability 





























































































If the Agent satisfies the Maastricht criteria EMU will be established and 
second period utility, for both Principal and Agent, will be given by equation (4). 
Otherwise second period payoffs are still given by equations (1) and (2). EMU is 
characterized by two parameters: first, the common fixed (net) benefits of EMU, 
mainly transactions cost savings, which we denote as V 3. Second, the relative 
weights of the two groups of countries in the common objective function, y, is the 
weight of the Principal's preferences. In a literal interpretation the weights simply 
reflect the voting power of the two groups of countries in the council of the 
European central bank. Thus a high y implies a small "hard core" EMU that 
excludes many of the uncertain candidates. In addition, y can be understood as a 
delegation parameter, i.e. the extent to which the ECB is a Rogoff (1985) 
conservative central bank. Then y may be a proxy for the degree of central bank 
independence or the degree to which the ECB can solve the credibility problem 
either by virtue of a superior institutional setup or more hawkish preferences.
U f a - 1 )  = ( l - Y ) U l ( A )  + y U l ( P )  + T,  O s y s l  (4)
Equation (5) gives the total utility, applying the discount factor 6 to the second 
period payoff. Other than just expressing countries' time preference 6 may also 
vary with the likelihood that EMU is perceived to happen and the date at which 
EMU is predicted to come about.
u , ( f )  = u;  + b U l2( f ) ,  0 £ & £ l, i - H , L  (5)
This concludes the discussion of players' payoff functions. Note that, of course, 
the Principal is not a player in the reputation game, since his preferences are 
public knowledge. He is only concerned with his period two payoff which is 
affected by the contract /  and the EMU parameters y and T. Therefore henceforth 
by policymaker we mean the policymaker in the Agent countries. The 
Policymaker's strategy sb for each type, prescribes a pair of inflation rates jc{, 
one for each period. The public, which we can think of as the international 
financial markets, is assumed to form expectations rationally'4. The public's 
strategy e is a pair of expected inflation rates n et for the two periods, where the 
second period expectation will be contingent on the inflation rate observed in the 134
13 In general, of course the non-credibility costs and benefits of EMU that are captured by T 
will differ across countries and between the Principal and the Agent in particular. This can be 
easily accommodated in the model. The key assumption we do make is that T is independent of 
type.





























































































first period. This means that the prior beliefs X and (1 -X) will be updated in the 
light of any information revealed by first period play.
The solution concept applied to the reputation game thus characterized is 
Perfect Bayesian (Nash) Equilibrium. In incomplete information games 
equilibrium is a function of beliefs as well as strategies. Refinements of Nash 
equilibrium, here, therefore aim to rule out "unreasonable" beliefs much in the 
same spirit as subgame perfection restricts "non-credible" actions in full 
information games.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium is a pair (sit e) such that
(i) policies Sj are optimal given equilibrium expectations e* and given type.
(ii) expectations are optimal given equilibrium policies s * and given beliefs.
(iii) posterior beliefs are obtained from the priors and observed policy according 
to Bayes' rule where it applies.
The final requirement tries to capture some notion of sequential rationality, but 
note that the restriction is very weak in that it only applies along the equilibrium 
path of play. Hence typically a continuum of equilibria is admissible depending on 
different assumptions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Furthermore, two classes of 
equilibria can be distinguished. In separating equilibria first period policies differ 
between the strong and the weak policymaker. Hence their type is fully revealed 
and payoffs in the second period are those of the one-shot game. In pooling 
equilibria both types choose the same first period inflation rate, thus no 
information is revealed and prior beliefs are not updated. We discard the 
possibility of mixed strategy (semi-separating) equilibria which arises if players 
are allowed to randomize over their pure strategies as implausible for the policy 
context. In order to reduce the multiplicity problem Definition 1 can be 
strengthened by adding the following further restrictions:
(iv) strategies sj that are dominated are not admitted in equilibrium.
(v) strategies sj that are equilibrium dominated in the spirit of Cho and Kreps 
(1987) are not admitted to support equilibrium.
For sections three and four we draw on requirement (iv) as well as assume a 
particular simple and plausible structure of off-equilibrium beliefs in order to 
single out one candidate separating and one candidate pooling equilibrium only. 
This concludes discussion of the reputation game.
Finally, we turn to the contracting stage. The Maastricht Treaty in general and 
the convergence criteria in particular are clearly the result of a complex bargaining 
process. We have already pre-empted the simplifying assumption that we choose 




























































































Principal. This means that they are endowed with all the bargaining power and 
can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer with regard to the Maastricht criteria. This 
appears a realistic approximation of how the criteria were actually inserted into 
the treaty by the Dutch presidency with support from Germany15. The Principal is 
concerned about period two utility, i.e. about which type of country joins EMU. 
For any pair of inflation rates n\ taken as given, three types of contracts can be 
distinguished. First, for all contracts f ] the threshhold inflation rate, as defined in 
equation (3), blocks EMU (keeps both types out). Second, "conditional" contracts 
f 2 admit the strong type into EMU. Here two cases must be distinguised. Under 
separation both types play different first period inflation rates and the 
conditionality "bites". However, if both types play an identical first period 
inflation (pooling) conditionality does not bite. Then, inviting the strong into EMU 
will also attract the weak. Third, under "unconditional EM U"/? both types enter.
/]  V f  with S < jrf
j with jt( s  it < jr under separation
with Jif = r t f  = k under pooling
"no EMU"
"conditional EMU" (6)
/ 3 V /  with jt > jtf* "unconditional EMU"
In equation (6) the Agents' first period inflation rates n\ are parametric. In 
general they will depend on the contract and on the equilibrium that obtains. Since 
the Principal's only concern is about the type of country that might join EMU, we 
simplify and only consider one particular contract for each case. Namely we set 
the threshhold inflation rates for /) and f 3 equal to -°o and & respectively, and for 
f2 equal to the respective equilibrium inflation rate of the strong type. For the 
model of section four S = 0 under contract f2 for both the separating and the 
pooling case.
What is important for EMU in this model (and in reality) is that countries' 
preferences, their degree of inflation aversion, are not contractible, even if 
revealed ex post. Thus the Maastricht criteria can only be based on observable 
inflation performance, entry cannot be made type-contingent. Thus, even if the 
Principal knew the Agent's preferences perfectly he could not make use of this 
information directly but would have to devise convergence criteria to circumvent 
this non-contractibility, which could then be thought of as some sort of political 
non-discrimination constraint. Incomplete information complicates the task of the
15 See Garrett (1993) and Sandholtz (1993) on the politics of EMU. Alternatively, we could 
assume that the criteria were drafted to optimize the Agent's utility subject to the Principal's 




























































































Maastricht criteria. With preferences known the criteria would simply serve as an 
exclusion device, an entry barrier to EMU to prevent weak countries from 
wanting to join. With incomplete information, the effects the criteria have on 
reputational incentives and on information revelation in stage two of EMU are an 
additional factor.
3. THE PRINCIPAL S PROBLEM
In drafting the Maastricht criteria, here determining the threshhold inflation rate 
prescribed by the contract /, the Principal's only concern is with his (expected) 
period two payoff. It will be zero in the absence of EMU, from equation (2) and 
given by equation (4) otherwise. Recall that his contract choice, as described in 
equation (6), is between conditional and unconditional EMU or blocking it 
altogether. If EMU is conditional, the Principal runs the risk either of EMU not 
coming about (in separating equilibrium) or of joining up with the weak type (in 
pooling), both with probability (l-X). We call the first event "hard EMU", the 
second "soft EMU".
no EMU(«£): t / 2(P ) = 0 for "no EM U " ( / , )
hard EMU(/i£): (7)
EU2(P)  = ^[-(1  -  Y)2^ i /2  + r j  for "conditional separating EM U " ( / / )
soft EMU(.v£):
EU2(P)  »  - X ( l - y ) 2b f  /2 - ( l - k ) ( \ - y ) 2b2H/2  + T
|  for "cond. pooling EMU  " ( f 2 ) 
|  for  " uncond. EMU" ( fa)
Comparing these three payoffs we can establish four possible preference 
rankings and it is most convenient to express the three critical points that divide
these regions in terms of T.
U2(nE) <U2(hE) V 7 a 7 j, T\ = ( l - Y ) 2*>t/2 if  ( f 2 ) exists
U2(hE) <U2(sE) v r& 7 2, T2 = ( l - Y ) 2^ / 2 i f  ( f 2 ) exists (8)
U 2 (nE ) < U 2(sE)




























































































From the above we can establish that Tj s T 3 <,T2. The first thing to note is that 
contracting for a conditional hard EMU, if possible, expands the range of T  for 
which the Principal will sign the Maastricht Treaty. Empirically, given that the 
convergence criteria are included in the treaty, we can rule out that the Principal's 
T is larger than T2. This is also reflected, for example, in German officials' 
repeated insistence that a "stable currency is more important than a single 
currency". However, if pooling equilibrium obtains, the Principal's screening 
efforts are frustrated and then he must either let both types in or must refuse to 
sign the treaty. Given that the treaty has been signed, this suggests that T  is large 
enough to risk conditional pooled entry T a T3, but not large enough to offer 
unconditional entry. Thus the critical threshhold inflation rate fo r/2 is set such as 
just to let in the strong type in a separating equilibrium. If no such equilibrium 
exists, the threshhold is set to just let in both types on the pooling equilibrium.
It is also obvious from equation (7) that the Principal's utility is always 
increasing in his weight y in EMU. All else equal, he will prefer a small EMU or, 
in the alternative interpretation, will try to maximize conservatism and 
independence of the European Central Bank. However, if we consider y a choice 
variable at the contracting stage (in addition to the threshhold inflation rate 
prescribed by f) we must also take into account the effect y has on preference 
revelation in the reputation game. To examine this question and to understand 
why and under which circumstances the Agent may want to sign the Maastricht 
treaty we turn to the analysis of the reputation game next. Note that the Principal's 
problem simplifies for the special case considered in the next section, where the 
strong Agent shares the Principal's preferences (bt =0). Then "hard EMU" is 
always preferred to "no EMU" as long as T is positive and thus T,=0.
4. MIMICKING 
Equilibria
Both for this section and the next the first step in looking for equilibria is to 
isolate one single plausible candidate equilibrium for the separating and the 
pooling case respectively. This is achieved by invoking requirement (iv) from 
section two, which eliminates dominated strategies. For the strong type16 this 
implies that under pooling she will always play her one-shot optimum and under 
separation will play the inflation rate which separates her at least cost. For the





























































































weak type this means that for pooling he must imitate the strong's one shot 
inflation in the first period and that he will play his one-shot optimum in the 
separating case. Recall that in the second period both types play their one-shot 
inflation, independent of expectations. Restricting attention to undominated 
strategies also means each player will only consider a single (most profitable) 
possible deviation strategy (D) from equilibrium. In separating equilibrium the 
strong type may consider deviating to her one-shot optimum (if that differs from 
equilibrium inflation) and the weak type may want to mimick the strong in the first 
period. In pooling equilibrium, the strong considers deviating to a first period 
inflation that would separate her, the weak may want to revert to his one-shot 
optimum. We have ruled out that the threshhold contract devised by the Principal 
interferes with these uniqueness properties given our earlier assumptions on fy 
Thus for existence of equilibrium in the reputation game, separating (S) or pooling 
(P), it suffices to show that the following incentive compatibility contraints are 
satisfied for both types.
V,k ( f j ) =  U t ( f j ) - U P U j )  * 0, k = S , P  i = L , H  j  = 1,2,3 (9)
Equilibrium conditions for each pooling and separating will differ depending on 
the contracts fj, which are taken as given for the reputation game. Finally, for each 
equilibrium we must specify the structure of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that 
support equilibrium.
This section considers the special case where the strong type's weight on 
surprise inflation in equation (1) is zero, just like the Principal's. Thus she always 
plays zero inflation and her incentive compatibility constraints in equation (9) are 
always satisfied17. We only need to consider the weak type's reputational 
incentives. We are ready to propose the following equilibria:
17 Note that this is always true for T=0. For positive T there may be a range of values for which 
signalling behaviour can become profitable. Then the game becomes as in section five. For now 




























































































PROPOSITION 1 : The reputation game, with bL=0, has a separating
equilibrium with18
rtf = rtf = 0, 
rtf =(1-X)Z>W,
„ H « , 
3Ij — JC2 —
e f °
0VI
rt2 = ( ,
K i f  rt] > 0
iff
for / ,  (rt, ) = /i
• 8 < 
Ô £
1
2(1+7’/  8# 
1
2(1 -  Y)
-  Y 2 /2 )
/o r / y (rt,) = / 2 
for f j ( i t ,) = / 3
Proo/: see APPENDIX A
It is easy to show that the weak type's "excess payoff from not deviating V/) , 
as defined in equation (9), is decreasing in the discount factor 6 in all cases. The 
intuition is straightforward. A larger 6 makes the future gains from mimicking 
more attractive relative to the first period losses. For a small 8 it is more profitable 
to reap the benefits from surprise inflation in the first period. How do the two 
possible Maastricht contracts affect the sustainability of separating equilibrium? 
For the conditional contract f 2 the two components of EMU work in opposite 
directions. Delegation (y) encourages separation, because the weak type can only 
reap a fraction of the benefits of surprise inflation once he joins EMU. The 
benefits T of EMU, on the other hand, undermine separating equilibrium. The 
latter effect obviously disappears if EMU is unconditional (f3) and in fact the 
effect from delegation will be stronger than under f 2. For y>l/2 separating 
equilibrium will even exist for all values of 8. The reason is that delegation has 
two opposing effects on the weak country. It is beneficial because it lowers the 
inflationary bias in period two but it also entails a loss in that it diminishes the 
ability to surprise inflate. As we see from contract f 2 the latter effect dominates 
the former. Under the Maastricht criteria, for a given T, the higher y, i.e. the 
smaller EMU or the more conservative/independent the ECB, the more will weak
18 Note that we are cavalier about second period expectations. They here only concern the 
Agent's contribution, i.e. when /=  0 , not the Principal's nor the effect of the particular contract. 
The impact of the latter two, of course, is known for sure and the correct inflation expectations 




























































































countries be tempted to ignore the criteria and stay out. Multi-speed Europe 
makes self-selection more likely.
PROPOSITION 2: The reputation game, with bL=0, has a pooling equilibrium 
with
r  r  n  n  h .TCi — JT 9 — U, Ttj — U, Jt o — D u
iff
<  =0,
0 i f  ji, < 0
(1 -* .)b H » / « , -  0




2 [ y ( l - y  2) + /,(1 -  y ) + T ' h j f )]
for /y(3i|) = /i  
/o r / y ( j l | ) -  / 2
2M1-Y)
/o r  / . ( * , ) = / ,
Proof: see APPENDIX B
Here, the weak type's "excess payoff" from not deviating from pooling 
equilibrium is increasing in the discount factor 6 in all cases. Again, a larger 6 
makes the future gains from mimicking more attractive relative to the first period 
losses. For pooling equilibrium the prior reputation of the players becomes 
important. The higher the initial reputation (probability of being strong) X, the 
more attractive it becomes for a weak country to masquerade as strong in the 
Maastricht game. The impact of the Maastricht contract now will depend also on 
prior reputation. For the conditional contract f2 the delegation effect (y) is now 
ambiguous as we can see from equation (10).
0 hKI2 > = 6(1 -  a. -  y), — £ - a 0  if  Y S Y - ( l - X ) ,  i . e . \ s k (  1 - y )  (10) 
dy by
The prior reputation now acts like a weight on the benefits of surprise inflation 
which in turn are increasingly impeded with greater y. For a weak country with a 
bad reputation increasing delegation in EMU (or a small hard-core EMU) makes 
EMU and thus pooling equilibrium more attractive. This may explain the 
enthusiasm with which countries like Italy and Spain pushed for EMU and their 




























































































benefits of delegation in terms of a lower inflation bias become the dominant 
factor. The reverse argument suggests that weak countries mimicking as strong 
and enjoying a high (undeserved) reputation would be deterred by the prospect of 
a hard/conservative or multi-speed EMU. If there was remaining doubt that (high 
reputation) France may still be a weak country, the very fact that it accepted 
central bank independence and was and is ready to join even a small EMU thus 
signals that these doubts are unfounded. We will come back to these 
considerations when we consider participation constraints at the contracting stage. 
Increasing T, the net benefits from EMU, of course, makes pooling more likely. 
However, T may also be negative for countries like the UK and Denmark, leading 
to separation rather than pooling if they are weak, and making an opt-out 
necessary if they are strong. If EMU is offered unconditionally (ff) delegation will 
always make pooling less attractive for the weak countries to the point of ruling it 
out altogether, depending on the values of X and b.
Welfare and Participation
We have discussed the equilibrium outcomes given the three possible 
Maastricht contracts. We have also discussed the Principal's motivation in the 
contract stage, i.e. the time when the treaty was negotiated and signed. This 
leaves us to complete the analysis by checking the Agent's participation 
constraints. At the contract stage we assume that the Agent can block or veto the 
Maastricht treaty or negotiate an opt-out. For now we assume that his reservation 
utility is then that obtained in the reputation game without the treaty, which is 
equivalent to contract /). This ignores the important possibility that in rejecting or 
accepting contract offers information is revealed to the public. Then the 
reservation payoff could well be given by the full information solution instead. 
This opens the possibility that the Maastricht treaty may have been signed by 
weak countries only to avoid to be recognized as weak, starting from a pooling 
situation during the latter-day hard-EMS. Discarding this possibility for the 
moment, we require for participation that the Agent is no worse off under the two 
possible EMU configurations (/?,/;) than if EMU does not happen (/,). To check 
this, we examine how adding the contracts affects utility within the same 
equilibrium (equation (12)) and across equilibria19 (equation (13)), since the range 
of parameters for which separating and pooling equilibria exist varies with f ,  as
19 We do not consider mixed strategy equilibria explicitly, but since these are by definition a 





























































































we have seen. It is useful first to compare welfare across the two equilibria for the 
same contract (equation (11)).
m f j ^ U f U ^ - U f U i )  i = L , H  j  = 1,2,3 (11)
* ? * ( / ; ) -  t/* ( / ;■ ) -* /* ( / ,)  * 0, k = S , P  i = L , H j  = 2,3 (12)
(? ;( /;,/) = U h f j ) - U i P( f i ) ,  k = S , P  i = L , H  j , / - 1,2,3 j  * l (13)
These are a lot of cases to check and some of them turn out to be trivial. We 
summarize some of our results in the following propositions refering to these three 
comparisons respectively.
PROPOSITION 3: Comparing payoffs for the same contract for the H-type we 
find:
(i) For all parameter values that sustain pooling equilibrium, the resulting 
payoff is always preferred to the payoff obtained in separating equilibrium.
(ii) The same statement under (i) does not hold for separating equilibrium with 
respect to pooling equilibrium.
(iii) The "marginal" Agent, whose parameters just sustain separating 
equilibrium, but not pooling would strictly prefer to be in pooling 
equilibrium (for Ax 1).
Proof: omitted; for each case, use the equilibrium conditions from Propositions 
1 and 2 together with equation (11), for each contract.
The results stated in Proposition 3 confirm the intuition that under incomplete 
information reputation can substitute for commitment in addressing the inflation 
bias of the one-shot game. Clearly this benefit only holds in pooling equilibrium. 
Separating equilibriua, and thus the full losses from the inflation bias, obtain 
where reputational incentives do not suffice as a discipline. This suggests that the 
Agent's utility would often be smaller if the Maastricht treaty pushed her from 
pooling into a separating equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4: Comparing payoffs for the same equilibrium across 
contracts we find:
(i) In separating equilibrium the weak type will always prefer the 
unconditional EMU contract/ ,  to the other two (for T>0).
(ii) In pooling equilibrium the weak type will prefer EMU (f2 or ff)  to no EMU 




























































































Proof, omitted; for each case use equation (12) and check the derivatives w.r.t 
y and T.
Note that (i) is intuitive, since in separating equilibrium the surprise inflation is 
placed in the first period anyway and thus is not affected by EMU. What remains 
are the benefits from reduced inflation bias and T. The condition in (ii) is identical 
to the condition that must hold such that the conditional contract makes pooling 
more likely. We refer the reader back to the earlier discussion of Proposition 2 in 
order to recall the two opposing effects from delegation. Thus, if the condition in 
(ii) is violated the treaty (f2) will push the weak country into separating 
equilibrium and will make it worse of, as we will see in Proposition 5 (i) below. 
However, the condition is not very tight, unless reputation A. is very high. Besides, 
empirically, at the time of the Maastricht negotiations there was a lot of optimism 
and at least a rhetoric of one-speed, rather than multi-speed Europe. At least in 
one of our interpretations this means that y was possibly seen as small enough to 
induce even the weak countries to sign. Alternatively, the fact that member states 
with the exception of the opt-out cases (owing to low or negative T) did all sign 
up, may also mean that all countries are in fact strong and want to reap a positive 
bT. The effects of the continuing crisis in the EMS and the policy developments 
since Maastricht on the participation constraint are ambiguous20. The possibility 
of a small hard-core EMU (large y) makes the constraint more binding, since 
weak countries having signed up for Maastricht may not want to be part of a small 
EMU. On the other hand, if the effect of the crisis has been to reduce weak 
countries' reputation (i.e. increased (1 -/.)) they will become even more eager to 
join.
PROPOSITION 5: Making some comparisons across contracts and across 
equilibria we find:
(i) If conditional EMU (f 2) destroys pooling equilibrium the weak type will 
always be worse off in an alternative separating equilibrium.
(ii) If unconditional EMU (f3) destroys pooling equilibrium the "marginal"
\ X / 9 / 2~weak type will be made better off if A. > — + " ^ / ( l - y )  - 2  T/bfj .
Proof: omitted; use equation (13) and equilibrium conditions in Proposition 2.
The result under (i) confirms our earlier conjecture and means that a weak type 
would not sign the Maastricht treaty if the condition (ii) of Proposition 4 holds,
20 Note that for the purpose of discussion here we relax one assumption of the model, which is 




























































































which we discussed above. The result in (ii) qualifies our earlier conjecture that 
moving away from pooling equilibrium will generally hurt the weak type. Here, 
for a big enough reputation this is not necessarily so, at least on the margin. Both, 
the benefits of delegation and increasing T can compensate for the loss of 
reputation that the separating equilibrium induces relative to pooling. We 
summarize:
PROPOSITION 6: The equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 for the 
reputation game are also equilibria of the contracting game (i.e. satisfy 
participation on top of incentive compatibility constraints for both types of 
Agents) for
(i) conditional EMU (f2) 
f or < ~ r  — Y (1 '
S o r ^ r - Y ( l - X ) s - ^ < ^
2 K  2
for 8 < 1/2 always
for 8 > 1/2 never
for 8 s  1/2 always 
for 1/2 < 8 s  1/2(1 + T!b2H -  y 2 /2) 




(ii) unconditional EMU (fj)
8 < 1/ 2 always
1/2 < 8 < 1/2A.( 1 — y ) if 8 s 2X -1
2X -  1 + (1 -  y)2 -  2T/bjf
8 a 1/2X(1 -  y ) if  T /b2H a y 2 j l  -  y (1 -  X)
Proof: omitted; note first that for each contract the regions of parameters 
satisfying the equilibrium conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 are disjoint (for 
X<l).Thus for any set of parameters we can never have pooling and separating 
equilibrium coexist. Also recall that the strong type can never lose from EMU, 
thus participation constraints will only bind on the weak type. Given this we can 
make the comparisons suggested in equations (11) to (13) for the relevant cases 




























































































As discussed before, there are two possible reasons why the (weak) Agent's 
participation constraint may be violated. First, pooling equilibrium payoffs may be 
reduced by the delegation effect so much as to outweigh the reputation gain and 
the joint benefits of EMU. Second, the Agent may be pushed out of pooling into 
separating equilibrium by the treaty. Then he loses the benefits from reputation 
with no (f2) or possibly insufficient (f3) compensating benefits from EMU. Note 
that a large enough T  can relax all participation constraints. In conclusion,, at the 
Maastricht Treaty stage, while the Principal will always want to contract for a 
separating equilibrium, the Agent (if weak) will in general prefer pooling in order 
to reap the benefits of reputation. For that reason he may prefer that entry to EMU 
be made conditional to the unconditional contract (f3). This can explain why there 
was very little opposition against the convergence criteria at the time they were 
drafted. The Treaty then enhances the weak countries' reputation in the transition 
to EMU, while serving as a partial exclusion device in the interest of the Principal 
as well.
5. SIGNALLING
The simple version of the model as presented in section four suffices to tell the 
basic reputation story. The extension to the general case (/>;>()), where the strong 
type also has a strategic role to play is not trivial. For limitations of space, 
therefore, we will only give a brief discussion to convey the flavour of the results 
that were obtained. The main difference to the previous section is that the range of 
parameters for which separating equilibrium obtains will generally expand, 
because of the strong countries' incentives to signal their type in the first period. 
Thus the reputation effect in these circumstances will discipline the strong rather 
than the weak country and the Principal's task of screening out the weak countries 
is facilitated.
In deriving equilibrium here the incentive compatibility constraints in equation 
(9) must be checked for both types. Also, while the candidate pooling equilibrium 
remains unaltered, signalling may lead to a separating inflation rate n  < bL , i.e. 
below the strong country's one-shot optimum. In looking for such a separating 
equilibrium, the first step is to define the lowest possible inflation rate that the 
strong would consider in order to separate herself as k L and the lowest possible 




























































































PROPOSITION 7: In the reputation game with bL>0 the weak type will never 
choose inflation below k H and the strong type never below n L, where 
r = bHjbL a 1, with
n H = bH{ \ - ^ 2 b ( r  - l ) / r )  j  
k L =bL[ \ - ^ 2 b { r - \ ) )  J
for f j  (it, ) = /,
= bH ( 1 -  ^2b[(l  -  y2/ 2 ) - ( 1 - Y) /r  + 7 > 2„ ] )
«L - ( l "  v 2 ô [ r - ( l - Y+Y2/2) + 7 y ^ ] )
/o r / j  (Jt ! ) = / 2
= *// (l -  V20(! ~ Y)(r -  0 A ) |
^  (l -  V 2 ô ( l - y ) ( r -  1))
/o r f j ( n ]) = f 3
Proof: omitted, solve equation (9) for ft, (as the candidate deviation inflation rate) 
as an equality for each contract.
From Proposition 7 we can already read off the effect the treaty has on the two 
players' incentives. For unconditional EMU, the delegation effect works in the 
same direction for both types. The strong is less willing to signal, the weak is less 
inclined to mimick. For the conditional contract (abstracting from T for the 
moment) the incentive goes in the opposite direction for the strong type, since 
now the reward of lower expected inflation in EMU is contingent on successful 
signalling in period one. The effect is ambiguous for the weak type. Define q as 
the inverse of r, then he will be less willing to mimick as y increases as long as 
y <q =bL/bH . This condition is intuitive, since the greater the difference in 
preference (for given y), i.e. the higher the gain from surprise inflation, the more 
likely will mimicking behaviour be. For given q, delegation y reduces the benefits 
from mimicking for if types are similar enough. Then the inflation bias effect is 
dominated by the suprise inflation effect.
PROPOSITION 8: The reputation game, with bL>0, has a separating equili­
brium with
-i. _* £ „£ U „  H .
JI] — J l — J I^  JI9  — O , JT j — XC 2 — ^ H
jrf = Ajc* + (1 -  X)bH , jt‘ = \^ L ‘f  K ] ~ n,





























































































1 r < (  26 + 1>
2
* 2 ’ U s - U
1 r < f26 + n
2
V
2 ’ U s - l J . y b H
1 r < 2 5 ( l - y )  + r
2
2 ’ 2 6 ( 1 - v ) - l j
for f  j ( j t ,) = /i  
for f j ( n ]) = f 2
for f j ( n x) = / 3
If the signs of the inequalities on r and 6 are reversed, it can be show for 
contracts f } and / ? that separating equilibrium obtains without signalling, i.e. 
jt =bL . Note that for contract f 2 we only provide a sufficient condition and 
assume 7=0, to ensure that the effect from y on the equilibrium condition is 
unambiguous. To obtain uniqueness we have deleted all dominated strategies
TC <
Proof: omitted, show Jtw a it L for existence, using Proposition 7 and lots of 
algebra.
The results above at first sight appear counter-intuitive, since we require for 
separation that types are not too dissimilar. The paradox disappears if we consider 
two cases of dissimilarity separately. If the b of the strong type is very low, she 
will not care about future expected inflation and thus has little incentive to signal. 
Conversely, if the weak's b is very high, it pays very much to mimick and thus 
separating equilibrium is destroyed by violation of his incentive compatibility 
constraint.
We skip analysis of pooling equilibrium, which becomes extremely messy, and 
which has also been argued to be implausible when signalling is possible (Vickers 
1986) and once the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion is applied. Moreover the 
effects of the reputational forces at work are not radically altered with respect to 
the previous section. The key message to take from this section, therefore, is that 
signalling behaviour will promote separating equilibrium (if country preferences 
are no too different) and gives the strong countries a strategic role. Then it is more 
likely that the weak countries are separated out in the Maastricht process. The 
adoption of the convergence criteria and the subsequent behaviour of countries 
would then reflect the (attempted) signalling behaviour of the strong types. To 
convince the public (financial markets) and the Principal of their toughness they 
willingly choose to suffer what appears to be "excessive" deflation, "unnecessary" 




























































































behaviour by many European countries, notably France, "sticking to their guns" 
during the EMS crisis and resisting even "reasonable" realignments (or continuing 
to play the EMS game even after the latter's death) then become easily explained 
as part of a perfectly rational longer term strategy, which has escaped most 
economic commentators.
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have shown how the Maastricht Treaty provisions, and the convergence 
criteria in particular, affect policymakers' incentives in a (monetary policy) 
reputation game. For the "conditional EMU" contract that chracterizes the 
Maastricht Treaty, greater joint benefits from EMU, a high discount factor and 
greater reputation make pooling behaviour more likely. The effect of delegation is 
ambiguous. We have shown that for large enough joint benefits and small enough 
delegation even weak countries are willing to sign up to Maastricht, while it is in 
the Principal's interest to try prevent weak countries from joining EMU and 
induce a separating equilibrium.
The empirical predictions of the two possible equilibria that we described are 
as follows. Under separating equilibrium strategic uncertainty is resolved ahead of 
EMU. Strong countries will have low inflation and suffer a recession in the 
convergence period, weak countries will enjoy a boom from surprise inflation. 
Under pooling equilibrium, all countries will have low inflation at first but 
strategic uncertainty will only be resolved once EMU is established, inducing a 
recession or a surprise inflation at that time. In this sense the two equilibria shift 
the costs of reputation building across time and across countries and the 
Maastricht criteria represent a (fragile) compromise.
The assumptions of the model that one wishes to relax for the discussion of 
policy are those of perfect contract commitment and fixed and certain parameters. 
This calls for the introduction of shocks and and an examination of the ex post 
credibility of the treaty, such as renegotiation proofness. In particular, many 
parameters of the treaty, in particular the size and composition of membership as 
well as the timing of EMU are determined in an on-going game. Most obviously, 
the criteria themselves are a moving target and are controversial in their 
interpretation. Still, our model has already identified some important elements of 
the Maastricht game that accord well with observation. It can explain the EMS 
crisis as a result of the Danish referendum in 1992, which made EMU look more 
remote (lower discount factor) and thus knocked countries out of pooling 




























































































France over the past few years. It illustrates countries' attitudes towards the 
prospect of a multi-speed Europe and the turbulances in financial markets as the 
result of collapsing reputation in a separating equilibrium. Our model is 
unsatisfactory, however, in ruling out that lost reputation can be regained, but we 
can interpret changes in governments or political situations as re-establishing 
strategic uncertainty and re-starting the reputation game.
With regard to the current policy debate over the way forward for EMU our 
model can be used to assess the proposels that have been made to circumvent or 
amend the Maastricht treaty. The need to build reputation for EMU in particular 
rules out a quick EMU, particularly if large. Our analysis flatly rejects De 
Grauwe's (1994) proposal that entry to EMU should be made both unconditional 
and voluntary, which is a recipe for a low-reputation union that no-one would 
want to join. It also rules out De Grauwe's suggestion that EMU should go ahead 
without Germany, which in our model appears as the main source and producer of 
credibility within EMU. The model also argues against an early Europeanization 
of monetary policy, e.g. by upgrading the role of the European Monetary Institute 
and resurrecting the EMS as suggested by Artis (1994). The whole point of stage 
two of EMU, as modelled here, is to test national policymakers. In terms of 
preference revelation the collapse of the narrow ERM has been a blessing not a 
curse21. However, the Artis proposal does make a lot of sense if it is seen as a 
measure (we would say signal) to restore credibility and commitment to the 
Maastricht treaty.
This paper has given an economic defence of Maastricht as an attempt to 
coordinate and contract reputation building for EMU. Thus from our perspective 
the main obstacles to Monetary Union in Europe are not to be found in the 
provisions of the treaty but in the lack of commitment (perceived and real) to the 
treaty and a lack of consensus about its interpretation and ambitions. This itself 
may signal that convergence of preferences across Europe is as of yet insufficient 
to sustain as risky and ambitious a project as EMU.
21 German finance state secretary Haller (1994) has welcomed the new EMS (likening 
policymakers to automobilists): "while this places greater demands on the driver, it also permits 
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APPENDIX A: Proof of PROPOSITION 1
Note first that the condition for f ,  is a special case that can be derived from the 
other two by setting y and T equal to zero. Using equations (1), (4) and (5), with 
inflation rates and expectations as given in the Proposition, inserting into equation 
(9) for the H-type we have:
for f 2 ■ (X -1 /2  )b2 -  bb2 / 2 * - ( l - \ ) b 2 -  ô[(l -  y )2h2 /2  + ( 1  -  y )b2 /2  + t ]
simplifying: bj,[b(y 2 j l  -  1) + 1/2] a 67” yields the proposition.
for/2:
( k - y 2 ) b 2 - b [ ( l - y ) b 2H/ 2 - T ] * - ( l - \ ) b 2 - b [ ( l - y ) 2b2 /2 + ( l - y ) b 2 /2 + T] 
simplifying: bf] /2  a b ( l - y ) b ^  yields the proposition. □
APPENDIX B: Proof of PROPOSITION 2
Note again that the condition for / ,  is a special case that can be derived from the 
other two by setting y and T equal to zero. Using equations (1), (4) and (5), with 
inflation rates and expectations as given in the Proposition, inserting into equation 
(9) for the H-type we have:
for/2 : 6 [ - ( l - Y)2^ / 2  + M l - Y ) ^  + r ]  ;> b2 / 2 - b b 2 /2
simplifying: b[l -  (1 -  y )2 + 2?i(l -  y) + 27’/ / ^  j a 1 yields the proposition, 
fo r /,:  6 [ - ( l - y ) 2^ / 2  + M l - y ) ^  + r ]  * b2 /2  -  b[( \ - y )2 b2 /2  + t ] 
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